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THE COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF1 SUBROGATION UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
By THoM-As P. HARD1,AN

*

T has been held or said in several cases, including a West
Virginia case, that when an employe has been injured -by a
third-party tort-feasor and has received compensation under a
Workmen's Compensation Act, then, in the absence of special statutory provision to the contrary, not only may the employe recover
full damages from the third party in a common-law action, but the
administrator of the compensation fund has no right of subrogation for the compensation which he has paid, that is to say, is not
substituted in the place of the injured employe so as to give him
a right of reimbursement for the obligation which he paid but
which in justice should be ultimately paid not by him but by the
third-party tort-feasor.' Many Workmen's Compensation Acts,
however, expressly forbid a recovery of both "compensation" an4
common-law damages and provide that, if the injured workman
receives compensation under the Act, the administrator of the
workmen's compensation fund is subrogated pro tanto to the rights
of the injured workman against the third-party tort-feasor. Other
Acts, including the West Virginia Act, 2 are silent upon the question. Quaere, then: Are the statutory provisions as to subrogation merely declaratory of a common-law principle? For, if there
is no right of subrogation the cases allowing double recovery seem
to violate the common-law rule that there may not be a double satisfaction for the same wrong. The question of subrogation being
expressly covered by statute in many jurisdictions, it thus happens
that there is comparatively little authority directly in point.
Where, as in West Virginia, the question is not covered by the
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'See, e. g., Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N. J. L. 432, 91 AtI. 91 (1914),
but see the subsequent amendment to the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation
Act, P. L. 1913, pp. 312, 313; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
204 S. W. 376, 2 W. C. L. J. 592 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918); City of Austin v.
Johnson, 204 S. N%.1181, 2 W. C. L. J. 845 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918); Merrill v.
Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va 669, 92 S. E. 112 (1917) which relies upon.
vnd, for the point as to subrogation, must, in order to be understood, be read with
Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S. E. 952 (1916).
2See the various statutory provisions in 2 HONOLD, WORKUMN'S COMPENSATION,
pp. 977-1706.
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statute it must, of course, be decided by the principles of the common law. Upon principle, then, doesn't the common law forbid
such double satisfaction unless there is a concomitant right (if
subrogation? With reference to this question a New York court,
in a rather recent case, made the following significant statement :'
"The reason for the statutory declaration [against recovering both compensation and common-law damages] . . . is
founded upon the common-law rule that there should not be
a double satisfaction for the same injury."
The same reason is also stated in Honnold on Workmen's
Compensation.' It would seem, therefore, that the cases allowing
double recovery contravene well-settled principles of law unless
the administrator of the workmen's compensation fund has a eommon-law right of subrogation, and the only question is whether
he has such a right.
Fortunately the law of fire and marine insurance, i. e., indemnity insurance, furnishes a very close analogy. Thus, suppose
that A's house worth $10,000 is insured for $10,000 by the X
Insurance Company. Through the negligence of B the building
is burned to the ground. A, after receiving $10,000 from the Insurance Company, sues B for damages. When A is allowed to
recover it is well settled that the Insurance Company is, without
the aid of statute, subrogated to the right of the insured, that is
to say, the loss is made to fall ultimately upon the party upon
whom in equity it should fall, but the person insured, while receiving full indemnity, is not allowed to reap and retain a double satisfaction for the same wrong; and the Insurance Company having
paid what in equity should be paid by the party at fault is subrogated to the insured's rights against that party.5 Isn't the administrator of a workmen's compensation fund, then, who pays
what the third-party tort-feasor should in equity pay, likewise subrogated pro tanto to the rights of the injured workman against
the tort-feasor? It is true that the doctrine of subrogation has
no application to an ordinary contract of life insurance," but that
is, it seems, "because a contract of life insurance is not, like other
'Miller v. New York Rys. Co., 157 N. Y. Supp. 200, 201 (1916).
'HONNOLD, WorxmN's COMPENsATIo.N. § 46.
3See RiCITARDS, INSURANCE .AW, 3 ed., §52 and authorities therein cited.
'Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, 24 L. Ed. 580 (1877)
Aetna Life In,.
Co. v. Parker, 96 Tex. 287, 72 S. W. 168 (1903).
See RicHARDs, op. cit., §52.
'See SHELDON, SuBROGATION, 2 Cd.. §239.
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insurance, a contract of indemnity merely. ' 7 And, paradoxical
as it may seem, it is believed that the "life and accident" insurance under Workmen's Compensation Acts is in this aspect more
closely analogous to fire and marine insurance, i. e., indemnity insurance, than to ordinary life insurance, for the object of Workmen's Compensation Acts is in reality to indemnify the employe
for pecuniary loss sustained just as in case of fire and marine insurance where there is subrogation, and it is not largely to make
a legally permissible wager on the duration of life or the happening of an accident as in the case of an ordinary life insurance
policy where, because the contract is "not one of indemnity
merely," there is no right of subrogation. Thus in compensation
insurance the "average weekly earnings" of the injured person
at the time of the injury are commonly made the basis upon which
to compute benefits.8 What the injured employe receives is "compensation" for loss sustained, that is to say, the employe is merely
being "indemnified"0 just as in the cases of fire and marine insurance, which is not so in the case of ordinary life insurance.
Of course the compensation granted under the Act may not be
full. indemnity for every form of injury.10 For example, comipensation recoverable under the Act may be limited to a fixed sum
which is in a particular case less than the estimated loss. But
neither is the compensation paid under a fire or other indemnity
insurance policy necessarily full indemnity, e. g., a house worth
$10,000 may be insured for $1,000 only or against fire caused otherwise than by lightning, etc. In both compensation cases and fire
insurance cases the indemnity is only to the extent provided for
in the policy, the Workmen's Compensation Act being in practical
effect the policy in compensation cases and providing in general
only against loss in capacity to work, just as a fire insurance policy may provide only against certain kinds of loss.
It has been said, in support of the proposition that there should
be no subrogation in compensation cases, that the measure of damages is so different in the common-law action and in the suit for
aSee e. g. West Va. Workmen's Compensation Act, §31; Marhoffer
220 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 379 (1917).

v. Marhoffer,

9But see Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, supra, n. 9.
3OThis is evidently what the court meent in Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, supra, where
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compensation that the principles of subrogation are inapplicable. 1'
For example, damages for mere disfigurement or mere mental anguish, not resulting in loss of earning capacity, if recoverable at
all as "compensation"
uder a Workmnen's Compensation Act,
would of course not be recoverable in full measure at least under
the ordinary form of compensation act. But why this should
render the doctrine of subrogation inapplicable is not apparent,
for the measure of damages in an action on a fire insurance policy
may be quite different from the measure of damages against the
tort-feasor who caused the fire. Besides, in any case the injured
workman, like the insured under a fire insurance policy, receives
the full measure of damages recoverable in the common-law action,
and the administrator of the compensation fund is subrogated
only to the extent that he is to be repaid out of the common-law
damages the amount of compensation which he has paid to the injured party. In other words, the injured employe will in all cases
receive the full measure of damages for all injuries sutained,
whether mere disfigurement, mental anguish or otherwise.
It may be said that, where the workman, by deduction from
his pay or otherwise, pays a premium for this form of "life and
accident" insurance, he, therefore, takes the chance of not being injured, and, therefore, should be entitled to the benefit of his
bargain in addition to his common-law right against the thirdparty tort-feasor, for, even if he did not pay into the workmen's
compensation fund, i. e., insure, he would have his action against
the third party. But the prime purpose of the compensation insurance is to provide absolute assurance of recovery (even if limited recovery) in all cases coming within the Act, for it might be
impossible to recover in some cases, e. g., against the third-party
tort-feasor, and it is primarily for this absolute assurance that the
employe pays his premium. Besides, the insured pays a similar
sort of premium in fire and marine insurance cases where it is
settled law that there is a right of subrogation.
The fire and marine insurance cases-the indemnity insurance
cases-then, are, it would seem, substantially on all fours with
the compensation cases; in fact, the workmen's compensation fund
in West Virginia and in some states is an insurance fund and the
workman is in an accurate sense insured against injuries. His right
It was said that "the theory of the New York law is not indemnity for loss of
a member or physical impairment as such, but compensation for disability to
work made on the basis of average weekly wages."
"Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, supra, n. 1.
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to compensation in cases within the Act is absolute and irrespective
of fault in others. The analogy, therefore, seems to be about as
complete as analogies ever are, and if the fire or marine insurance company which pays for the loss is, without the aid of statute, subrogated pro tanto to the rights of the insured against the
tort-feasor, by parity of reasoning the administrator of the workmen's insurance fund, who pays the insured workman what in
equity should be paid by the tort-feasor, is likewise subrogated
pro tanto to the rights of the injured workman against such
wrong-doer; in other words, the provisions to that effect in many
Workmen's Compensation Acts are only declaratory of a commonlaw principle, being founded upon the common-law rule originating in equity but now generally enforced also at law that when one
has been compelled to pay an obligation which ought to have been
paid by another the former is entitled to exercise all the remedies
which the latter possessed against that other and to indemnity
from the fund out of which should have been made the payment
which he has made.' 2 The doctrine of subrogation is independent
of statute and independent of any privity or contractual relations
betwen the parties to be affected by it," s and, as is well said by
Justice Sheldon 4 "it is broad enough to include every instance
in which one party pays a debt for which another is primariky
answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience, should have
been discharged by the latter."
The doctrine of subrogation is not formal or technical and it
has been said judicially that he who in administering it would
"stick in the letter" forgets the end of its creation and perverts
the spirit that gave it birth. It is a creature of equity and essential justice is its object. 15
The right of subrogation is based upon the doctrine of indemnity, and, being a creature of equity, created to do equity, its purpose is to throw the ultimate responsibility upon the one upon
whom in equity it should fall, and to indemnify the innocent
party who pays. The loss in workmen's compensation cases should
fall ultimately upon the tort-feasor and as there is no equity in
favor of the injured person to allow him to receive a double satisfaction for a single wrong--a thing forbidden by settled principles
2

' see SHELDON, OP. cit., §11.
23Bassett v. Strelght, 78 w. Va. 262, 88 S. E. 848 (1916).
USHELDOn, op. cit., §1.
Italics ours.
UHawker -v. Moore, 40 W. Va. 19, 20 S. E. 848 (1894).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1920

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1920], Art. 4
WEST YIBINIA LAW QUARTEBLY

of law-and as such double recovery would unduly deplete the
workmen's compensation fund at the expense of innocent employes
and employers and to the unjust enrichment of the twice-paid employe, it is submitted that the administrator of the workmen's compensation fund, upon payment of compensation, is, without the need
of a statutory provision, subrogated pro tanto to the rights of the
injured employe against the third-party tort-feasor. This will indemnify the administrator of the fund for all compensation paid,
and at the same time will fully indemnify the employe for all
damage sustained, for, as we have seen, if the damages recoverable
against the tort-feasor are greater than the compensation recoverable under the Act, the employe will receive ultimately the larger
sum, for it is a settled principle of subrogation that in the absence
of express stipulation the doctrine is never to be applied so as to
prevent the injured party from being fully indemnified.1" Thus
everyone is fully paid, no one twice paid and the loss falls ultimately upon the only party at fault-the only equitable result.
bPhoentx Insurance Co. v. First National Bank, 85 Va. 765, 8 S. E. 719 (1889).
See RiciAuDS, INSURANCcE LAw, §52.
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